Tagged: PeoplesHealthMovement

코로나19 기술에 관한 긴급행동 요청 민중건강운동(PHM) 성명서

코로나19 기술에 관한 긴급행동 요청
민중건강운동(PHM) 성명서

2020년 10월 14일

 

민중건강운동(이하 PHM)은 세계무역기구(WTO)가 TRIPS 협정[1]의 특정 조항을 유예해 국가들이 유망 백신 후보물질, 의약품, 진단기기의 제조 규모를 확대할 수 있게 해달라는 인도와 남아프리카공화국 정부의 제안(이하 인도-남아공 제안)[2]을 지지합니다.

PHM은 국가 및 지역 수준의 다양한 개인들과 시민사회단체들, 사회운동이 함께 조직적으로 협력하여 인도-남아공 제안을 지지하는 운동을 벌일 것을 요청합니다. 이와 관련된 내용은 아래와 같습니다.

배경

코로나19 팬데믹은 가족과 지역사회를 황폐화시켰고 사회와 경제를 혼란에 빠뜨렸습니다. 전세계적으로 100만 명이 넘는 사망자가 발생했고 코로나19 후유증 등 엄청난 만성병 부담을 남겼습니다.

팬데믹 초기부터 세계보건기구(WHO) 사무총장은 글로벌 대응의 핵심으로 ‘연대’를 강조했습니다. 연대의 원칙은 WHO가 주관하는 ‘코로나 기술 접근 풀(Covid Technology Access Pool, C-TAP)’에 표현되었습니다. C-TAP은 지적재산과 노하우를 공유함으로써 백신과 의약품의 신속하고 광범위한 생산을 가능하게 할 수 있었습니다. 하지만, C-TAP은 제약사들로부터 멸시를, 부유한 국가 정부들로부터는 폄하를 당했습니다.

WHO는 또한 후보 의약품과 백신의 효과성에 대한 비교 연구를 가능하게 하는 임상 시험인 ‘연대’ 시험 프로그램을 제안한 바 있습니다. 의약품과 관련해 어느 정도 진전이 있었지만, 백신과 관련한 연대 임상시험은 아직까지 조직되지 않았습니다.

지난 4월 말, 진단기기, 의약품, 백신을 위한 글로벌 협력을 둘러싼 협상은 WHO에서 G20이 후원하는 ‘코로나 기술에 대한 접근 촉진기구(Access to Covid Tools Accelerator, ACT-A)’ 로 옮겨갔습니다. ACT-A는 코로나 관련 기술에 대한 ‘공평한 글로벌 접근’을 보장하기 위해, 중·저소득국가의 진단기기, 의약품, 백신 공급을 확보하기 위해 기부금 조달에 의지합니다. ACT-A는 백신, 의약품, 진단기기, 보건체계발전을 위한 4개의 ‘기둥’으로 구성됩니다.

ACT-A의 후원자들은 자금 지원을 통해 창출되는 사유화된 지적재산에 조건을 부과하는 것을 거부했습니다. 최우선 인구집단에 대한 가격에 약간의 제한이 있을 수 있지만, 일단 그들의 필요가 (가까스로) 충족되고 나면 거대 제약사들은 평소와 다름없는 영업전략에 어떤 제한도 받지 않을 것입니다.

지난 7월까지, 특히 미국, 영국, 유럽연합(EU)에 의한 대규모 사전구매가 효과적인 백신과 의약품의 초기 공급의 대부분을 선점하고, ACT-A의 자금 조달을 위태롭게 할 것이 분명해지고 있었습니다. 부유한 국가 정부들은 개발되고 있는 기술에 대한 더 폭넓은 접근이나 가격과 관련된 조건 없이, 수십억 달러를 제약사들에 넘겨줬습니다.

기술 풀링(C-TAP)에 대한 거부, ‘백신 민족주의’의 부상, ACT-A의 4개 기둥에 대한 자금 부족(과 공급 부족)은 특히 팬데믹 초기 몇 년 간 중·저소득국가의 접근을 심각하게 저해할 것으로 보입니다.

저렴하면서도 효과적인 진단기기, 의약품, 백신에 대한 접근에서의 피할 수 있는 지연은 팬데믹을 장기화할 것이며, 접근을 저해당하는 국가와 인구집단에서 수백만 명의 더 많은 확진자와 수만 명의 사망자를 초래할 것입니다.

인도-남아공 제안2에는 유예의 필요성을 설명하는 메모와 함께, WTO TRIPS 위원회 및 이후 일반이사회(WTO의 최고 의사결정기구)에서의 논의를 위한 결의안 초안이 포함되어 있습니다.

인도-남아공 제안은 꼭 필요하지만, 국내 및 국제 수준의 후속 조치가 필요합니다. 백신, 의약품, 진단기기의 현지 생산을 확대하려면 지적재산(특허, 영업기밀, 산업디자인 포함)에 대한 접근이 필요하지만 이것 만으로는 부족합니다. 새로운 생산라인을 구축하려면 암묵적인 기술 노하우와 제조법, 시험 자료에 대한 접근 또한 필요합니다. 그러한 추가 데이터가 원 개발자에 의해 제공되지 않는다면, 그것들은 다시 연구개발 되어야 하고, 이는 추가적인 협력과 공유를 필요로 하는 과정입니다. 남반구 협력을 포함, 조직화된 기술이전을 지원하기 위한 시급한 조치가 요구됩니다. 국제연합(UN)의 ‘기술 접근 파트너십(Technology Access Partnership, TAP)’은 의약품과 백신을 포괄할 필요가 있습니다.[3]

이러한 더 넓은 이슈들의 많은 수가 이미 지난 7월, TRIPS 위원회 논의를 위한 남아프리카공화국의 보고서에서 다루어졌습니다.[4]

 

PHM은 각국 정부가 향후 WTO 회의에서 인도-남아공 제안을 즉각 지지할 것을 촉구합니다.

PHM은 또한 각국 정부 및 국제기구들이 백신, 의약품, 진단기기에 대한 공평한 접근을 위해 다음과 같은 정책을 채택하고 이를 진전시킬 것을 촉구합니다.

  • 중저소득국가에서 현지 생산의 급속한 확대. 인도와 남아프리카공화국이 제안한 대로 TRIPS 조항들의 유예를 통해, 그리고 기술 이전을 위한 조직화된 국제협력 프로그램에 의해 보완. 장기적으로는 중·저소득국가에서 공공부문 제조 및 혁신 역량 확대, 그러한 공적 자산의 사유화를 추진하는 무역 조항들을 폐지.
  • 지적재산 및 기술 노하우의 즉각적이고 의무적인 풀링을 촉진하기 위한 TRIPS 협정의 가능성에 대한 강력한 탐구. 장기적으로는 수출을 위한 강제실시를 촉진하고 향후의 팬데믹 비상사태에서 의무적 기술 풀링에 대한 장벽을 제거할 수 있도록 TRIPS 협정의 개혁
  • 특히 국가 수준에서 지적재산권의 유예를 가능하게 하는 제73조 비상사태 조항을 포함하여, TRIPS 협정에 규정된 유연성을 충분히 효율적으로 사용할 수 있도록 국내 지적재산권에 관한 법률의 검토 및 개정
  • 국제적 공중보건 위기 상황(PHEIC)에서 의무적 기술 풀링과 비교 임상시험(‘연대 임상시험’)에 대한 의무적 참여를 작동시킬 수 있는 권한을 WHO에 부여하기 위해 국제보건규칙(IHR) 개혁
  • (TRIPS 협정과 공중보건에 관한 도하선언에서 규정된 바와 같이) 공중보건을 해치는 방식으로 사용되는 무역 및 투자 협정 상 투자자 국가 분쟁 해결 조항(ISDS)에 대한 전 세계적 중단과 장기적으로 해당 조항 제거
  • 현행 및 예정된 무역 및 투자 협정 중 보건의료 및 보건기술에 대한 접근을 저해할 수 있는 모든 조항에 대한 전 세계적 중단
  • 완전한 투명성, 오픈 라이센스, 의약품 및 백신의 연구개발 비용과 가격 간 연결 단절에 관한 조항을 포함하는 글로벌 연구개발 조약
  • 코로나19 팬데믹 맥락에서 소득보장과 보건체계발전을 위한 자금을 확보하기 위해, 많은 중저소득국가들이 가지고 있는 억압적인 국가 부채의 상환에 대한 전 세계적 지불 유예.

PHM[5]은 추가 자료에 대한 링크와 함께 공평한 접근에 대한 도전의 여러 측면에 관한 유용한 자료 모음을 정리한 바 있습니다.

 

PHM은 국가 및 지역 수준의 다양한 개인들과 시민사회단체들, 사회운동이 함께 조직적으로 협력하여 인도-남아공 제안에 대한 지지와, 코로나19 보건기술에 대한 공평한 접근을 위해 필요한 다른 개혁들을 위해 운동을 벌일 것을 요청합니다.

운동의 형태는 상황과 역량에 따라 달라질 것입니다. 가능한 예시는 다음과 같은 것들이 있습니다.

 

  • 정부(무역 당국자)에게 인도-남아공 제안 지지를 촉구합니다.
  • 당신의 국가, 그리고 인구의 다양한 계층에 대한 접근성 지연의 위협을 문서화하고 소통합니다. PHM의 EACT 프로젝트5에 참여하는 것도 고려해 보십시오.
  • TRIPS 협정에 명시된 유연성 조항이 충분히 사용될 수 있도록 국내 지적재산에 관한 법률 검토와 개정을 요구합니다.[6]
  • 국내에서 필요시 코로나19 동안 TRIPS 협정 유연성 조항의 완전한 구현을 촉구합니다.
  • 수출용 강제실시(TRIPS 협정 제31조의2)를 사용하지 않기로 약정한 국가에서는 해당 약정의 취소를 촉구합니다.
  • 대학 및 민간 기업이 수행하는 연구에 지원되는 공적 자금에 대한 조건 부과(특히 완전한 투명성과 오픈 라이센스)를 공개적으로 지지합니다.
  • 중저소득국가의 발언권이 보장되고 제도 개혁의 리더십을 제공할 수 있는 국제연합(UN)과 세계보건기구(WHO) 등 다자간 회원국 포럼의 보호를 요구합니다.
  • 국제보건정책 결정을 좌지우지하는 게이츠 재단의 권력에 도전합니다.
  • 저렴하고 효과적인 의약품과 백신에 대한 공평한 접근을 포함, 단일건강보험과 공적으로 관리되는 보편적 보건의료를 중심으로 사람들을 동원합니다.

 

민중건강운동(PHM Global) 블로그 게시글 바로가기 (영어원문)

 

첨부:

(영어원문) Urgent Call for Action on Covid-19 technologies: Statement by People’s Health Movement PHM_CovidCall2Action_201014

(국문번역)  코로나19 기술에 관한 긴급행동 요청_민중건강운동 성명서

 


[1]. TRIPS: Agreement on trade related aspects of intellectual property rights 무역 관련 지적재산권 협정

[2].  https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=q:/IP/C/W669.pdf&Open=True

[3]https://techaccesspartnership.net/posts/covid19-un-launches-platform-for-manufacturers-to-share-tech

[4]https://www.keionline.org/33593

[5] https://phmovement.org/eact (promoting equitable access to medical technologies in the context of COVID 19 코로나19 맥락에서 의료기술에 대한 공평한 접근 촉진하기)를 참고하십시오. EACT resources page를 참고하십시오.

[6]. PHM의 의약품 접근성 관련 온라인 코스에 참여하는 것을 고려해 보십시오. 다음을 참조. https://phmovement.org/online-course-announcement-the-struggle-for-health-and-access-to-affordable-medicines/

PHM Korea statement on COVID-19 outbreak and responses in South Korea

March 19th, 2020

 

South Korea (hereafter Korea)’s COVID-19 outbreak and response are still ongoing, and assessment of it is rather hasty. But we share this conditional statement because we think it is our responsibility to share Korea’s experience with civil society around the world, which is experiencing COVID-19 outbreak one tempo later than ours. In particular, we hope that the main barriers to the government responses and the efforts of the Korean civil society to find and fill the blind spots out of reach of the government policies or existing systems will be a lesson for the civil society of each country in the responses of COVID-19.

 

  • Barrier One: Reactionary right-wing alliance makes the situation worse.

 One of the most difficult challenges the government is confronted is the political assaults by the reactionary right-wing alliances, including the opposition party, Korean Medical Association (KMA) and right-wing news media. Before the general election in April, the right-wings blame the government for almost everything. They unnecessarily politicized the problems, which hampered reasonable and timely decision making by the government. They deliberately stick to the term ‘Wuhan Pneumonia’ and still demand a total immigration ban against Chinese people, although many experts repeatedly pointed out that it was unnecessary and special immigration process has been working very well. The opposition party disturbed the formation of an ad-hoc parliamentary commission to plan the supplementary budget for dealing with the outbreak, insisting that the commission name should include the term ‘Wuhan Pneumonia’. Even the KMA denounced the national advisory committee of which members are delegates from eleven academic societies, claiming that several members of the committee are leftists and clandestine power figures dominate government policies. Such a claim was absurd, but the committee was dissolved for protecting individual scientists from political attacks.[1][2] The KMA strongly criticizes the rationing of face-mask by the government and recommends that every citizen has to wear disposable face-mask without re-use in spite of the serious shortage of supply. In this situation, people are confused and lose trust in the government. Then the government is more likely to make hasty decisions and adopt populist measures and has to pay more efforts to rebuke fake news and misleading demands.

 

  • Barrier Two: The private, market-oriented healthcare system is the main barrier to cope with the COVID-19 though the ‘public control’ over the private hospitals and diagnostic kits industry makes the system keep to work.

 The number of beds owned by public hospitals accounts for around 10% of the national total, which is the lowest one among the OECD member countries,[3] and the health care delivery system from primary care through to the tertiary-care hospitals is not well organized. So as the number of patients sharply increased, it became very difficult for the government to procure beds and allocate patients according to their severity, especially in Daegu where the entire healthcare system was overwhelmed by the acute surge of patients related to the religious event. So-called ‘Big 5’ hospitals located in the capital city Seoul including Seoul Samsung Hospital which was the hotbed for the MERS-CoV outbreak in 2015[4] are surprisingly invisible in this situation except for the Seoul National University Hospital, while they account for 35.5% of total National Health Insurance benefits reimbursed to the tertiary-care hospitals.[5] The CSOs cannot but repeat their aged but never achieved claim that the government should expand public hospitals.

Now, tentative partial ‘public control’ over the private hospitals works by utilizing a pre-existing informal public-private network, not sufficiently but in a more organized way over time. Public control works much better with regard to the diagnostic kits production and supply.[6] Without the support from the government (Ministry of Food and Drug Safety and The Korean Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, KCDC) and the Korean Society for Laboratory Medicine, the industry would have never achieved the development and production of the diagnostic kits, and extensive screening tests with high quality would not be performed.[7] The acclaimed Korean test system is not the fruits of laissez-faire innovative capitalism and deregulation but an excellent example of tight coordination of public-private partnership and publicization of innovative technology. We should demand public benefit-sharing, including affordable prices and stable supplies and the public control over private sectors in dealing with public health emergencies instead of unleashed deregulation for innovation.

 

  • Barrier Three: Long-standing structural inequality/inequity paralyzes the control measures.

 Almost 80% of COVID-19 cases in Korea are linked to cluster infections,[8] and many of cluster cases reveal the structural inequity/inequality pervasive in Korea.

Among them, closed-ward hospitals for chronic psychiatric patients,[9] nursing homes for the elderly mostly in bedridden status, and living facilities for the severely disabled[10] became the hotbed for infection because of their poor living environments and underlying health conditions.

Dualized labor market which is caused by long-standing labor market liberalization makes effective prevention measures impotent; for example, the largest cluster infection in Seoul occurred in a call-center where workers cannot exercise ‘social distancing’ in a very crowded condition without proper ventilation system nor demand paid leaves in fear of layoff.[11] The more people stay at home for ‘social distancing’, the higher the work demands become in some sectors, such as call-centers and delivery services. One delivery worker died of Karoshi while dealing with skyrocketed online orders from the dawn to midnight.[12] As school closure extends, substitute teachers and caregivers in precarious employment have to work for children who cannot be cared at home, while regular teachers stay at home with paid leaves.[13] Pre-existing inequality and discrimination against low-waged, precarious workers aggravate the situation around the public health crisis.

 

 

  • Pros and Cons in the acclaimed ‘openness and transparency’ strategy of the Korean government.

 Korean Foreign Minister KANG Kyung-wha’s interview with the BBC on March 15th is gaining popularity. The strategy of the COVID-19 response by the Korean government, “openness, transparency and fully keeping the public informed,” appears to be paying off as Minister Kang said.[14]

There is a context in the government’s commitment to open and transparent responses. The secrecy strategy adopted by the right-wing government during the early phase of MERS-CoV outbreak in 2015 led to the failure of timely control and wide distrust in the government.[15] For the current liberal MOON Jae-in government, who was elected after the impeachment of the ex-president PARK Geun-hye, open and transparent responses to COVID-19 are becoming the barometers for legitimacy.

Current obsessive tracking/tracing of COVID-19 patients and information release/disclosure is possible thanks to the passage of the so-called ‘MERS act’ at the time of the MERS-CoV outbreak in 2015.[16] Recently, the government and the National Assembly also passed the so-called ‘COVID-19 acts,’ which allow involuntary testing, quarantine and treatment of those suspected of infection and the prosecution of those who refuse to test. This enabled the current aggressive massive screening tests.[17] While the ‘openness and transparency’ strategy is desirable in principle, there is a rising concern over privacy and human rights violation at the same time.[18] Indeed, many individuals were blamed and stigmatized as they ‘spread’ out viruses, and restaurants patients had visited had to shut down in order not to being blamed. After all, the National Human Rights Commission of Korea[19] announced the recommendation not to release specific addresses or workplace names of the COVID-19 patients, nor their travel path and the places they’ve visited to protect their privacy.[20] The KCDC had recently updated the guideline for local governments with incorporating such recommendations. However, CSOs have to follow up the situation and continue discussing how to protect population health in balance with individual human rights.

 

  • Role of civil societies.

Many NGOs and CSOs have been monitoring the situation the disadvantaged population, such as the disabled,[21] homeless,[22] and migrants[23] are faced with, and demanded government measures. Also, trade unions collected situation reports from their locals and investigated the sufferings of precarious workers who cannot access the paid leaves and proper protection from the COVID-19 infection.[24][25] On March 19th, NGOs and CSOs, including more than 40 organizations, national as well as local, announced a collective statement that the government should provide more support for vulnerable population, expand public hospitals, protect precarious workers regarding paid leaves and employment security, publicly control healthcare resources including face-masks, and organize community-based care system. Also the statement asserts that the media should stop their way of reporting obsessed with sensationalism and racism, stigmatizing special population groups.[26]

The government showed rather proper responsiveness; for example, undocumented immigrants can get the test without risk of deportation according to the decree of Ministry of Law,[27] and the Seoul Metropolitan Government began to provide ‘emergency care’ services for the disabled and the elderly who experienced the interruption of daily care services.[28] Although the government has shown unprecedented efforts and quick responses, the problems rooted in long-time under-investment in the social security system cannot be easily tackled. Many NGOs and voluntary community organizations are now trying to find and fill the blind spots in cooperation with local governments.

We hope this outbreak could facilitate social discussions for establishing a robust social protection system in Korea.

 

  • Participatory governance is needed dealing with pandemics.

 It is unrealistic to expect that all systems are perfectly in place in advance of an unprecedented public health crisis such as COVID-19 pandemic. There are many loopholes in the Korean government’s COVID-19 responses.

However, we could manage the situation better if we work together. Such loopholes could be filled through a ‘healthy’ partnership between the government and the civil society. The social power, including the CSOs, works to make the government actions more equitable and effective. The Korean civil society is closely monitoring the COVID-19 responses, as it did in the 2015 MERS-CoV outbreak,[29] with a focus on human rights and social justice.

We believe that ‘participatory governance’ would be effective for dealing with pandemic as well as defending democracy. We will keep working in solidarity.

 

pdf version of the statement:
PHM_Korea_statement_on_COVID_19_outbreak_and_responses

[1] The Hankyoreh 21, March 13, 2020, http://h21.hani.co.kr/arti/special/special_general/48375.html

[2] The SisaIN, March 17, 2020, https://www.sisain.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=41519

[3] OECD Statistics https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=30183

[4] Ki, 2015 MERS outbreak in Korea: hospital-to-hospital transmission, Epidemiol Health. 2015; 37: e2015033. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4533026/

[5] The Young Doctors, May 27 2019,  http://www.docdocdoc.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=1068705

[6] http://www.hitnews.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=15675

[7] The SisaIN, February 14 2020, https://www.sisain.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=41277

[8] The Korea Herald, March 14 2020, 8 in 10 coronavirus cases in S. Korea linked to cluster infections http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20200314000077

[9] The Washington Post, March 1 2020, How a South Korean psychiatric ward became a ‘medical disaster’ when coronavirus hit https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/how-a-south-korean-psychiatric-ward-became-a-medical-disaster-when-coronavirus-hit/2020/02/29/fe8f6e40-5897-11ea-8efd-0f904bdd8057_story.html?fbclid=IwAR1JUUYndQisgqmM0i5M7i5AzOFGmo-aRxoHx0zdSpKr43bIWZS-8CuEFMg#comments-wrapper

[10] VOA, February 26 2020, Coronavirus Outbreak Inside 2 S. Korean Medical Facilities Highlights Vulnerability of Disabled Patients https://www.voanews.com/science-health/coronavirus-outbreak/coronavirus-outbreak-inside-2-s-korean-medical-facilities

[11] Yonhap News Agency, March 10 2020, Seoul call center emerges as city’s biggest infection cluster, numbers feared to rise https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20200310002154315

[12] Korea Joongang Daily, March 17 2020, Union blames Coupang for delivery worker’s death http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=3075014

[13] The Redian, March 17 2020, http://www.redian.org/archive/141581

[14] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 15 2020, Andrew Marr interviews Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha http://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5674/view.do?seq=320056&srchFr=&srchTo=&srchWord=&srchTp=&multi_itm_seq=0&itm_seq_1=0&itm_seq_2=0&company_cd=&company_nm=&page=1&titleNm=

[15] Minjeong Kang et al., 2018, From concerned citizens to activists: a case study of 2015 South Korean MERS outbreak and the role of dialogic government communication and citizens’ emotions on public activism, Journal of Public Relations Research, 30:5-6, 202-229, DOI: 10.1080/1062726X.2018.1536980

[16] The Korea Times, July 9 2015, Install epidemics system https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/opinion/2019/11/137_182505.html

[17] Korea.net (Overseas Korea Centers), March 4 1010, Cabinet passes laws to fight COVID-19 outbreak http://www.korea.net/NewsFocus/policies/view?articleId=182884

[18] Korean Federation Medical Activist Groups for Health Rights (KFHR), February 25 2020, http://kfhr.org/?p=129581

[19] National Human Rights Commission of Korea, March 9 2020, https://www.humanrights.go.kr/site/program/board/basicboard/view?boardtypeid=24&boardid=7605121&menuid=001004002001

[20] The Hankyoreh, Mar 16 2020, Government decides not to disclose personal information about novel coronavirus patients http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/932783.html

[21] The Be Minor, March 18 2020, https://beminor.com/detail.php?number=14476&thread=04r03

[22] CSOs network, March 9 2020, http://www.konkang21.or.kr/bbs/board.php?bo_table=sotong_statement&wr_id=200

[23] Workers’ Solidarity, March 9 2020, https://wspaper.org/article/23620

[24] Korean Public Service and Transport Workers’ Union (KPTU), February 28 2020, KPTU Healthcare Workers Solidarity Division Statement on COVID-19 https://www.kptu.net/english/detail.aspx?mid=&page=1&idx=27605&bid=KPTU_PDSENG

[25] Korean Public Service and Transport Workers’ Union (KPTU), March 16 2020, COVID-19 and South Korean Workers, KCTU Demands https://www.kptu.net/english/detail.aspx?mid=&page=1&idx=27604&bid=KPTU_PDSENG

[26] CSOs network, March 19 2020, http://health.re.kr/?p=6357

[27] Yonhap News Agency, March 5 2020, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20200305142400064

[28] Seoul Metropolitan Government, March 16 2020, http://mediahub.seoul.go.kr/archives/1273495

[29] People’s Health Institute (PHI), 2016, http://health.re.kr/?p=2751